Another Republican administration might quit nuclear deal again, says expert

A defense editor at the Economist says that there is no real guarantee that a possible Republican administration in the U.S. in 2024 will not breach the nuclear deal again.
“There is no guarantee of this. Iran must contend with the
risk that a Republican administration in 2024 will once more walk away from a
deal,” Shashank Joshi stated.
President-elect Joe Biden has promised to rejoin the JCPOA
that was signed when he was vice president if Iran also agrees to return to
full compliance. Nonetheless, diplomats and analysts believe it is unlikely to
happen smoothly because skeptical adversaries want further commitments from
each other.
The lesson that can be learned from the Trump era is that the
US is highly polarized and that diplomatic agreements may be less enduring and
stable than they were before. Joshi, who served as a senior research fellow at
the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), also remarked that “the
assassination of Mr. Fakhrizadeh was probably conducted by Israel, and follows
several other killings over the past decade.”
Prominent Iranian scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was
assassinated outside Tehran on November 27. Iranian officials were quick to accuse
the Israeli regime for the assassination.
“The assassination was a highly provocative move and
probably aimed at disrupting the incoming Biden administration's effort to
re-join the JCPOA,” remarked Joshi, who also previously worked as a research
associate at Oxford University’s Changing Character of War Program.
The following is the entire text of the interview conducted
and published by the Tehran Times:
“Q: Would you expect the incoming Biden administration to
reach a consensus with Iran to revitalize the JCPOA as some argue that it is a
tough project?
A: I think it is very likely that a Biden administration
will reach a deal with Iran. But there are two questions. One is whether it
will be a U.S. return to the JCPOA, or something more limited involving U.S.
sanctions relief and Iran returning to compliance. The second question is
whether a follow-on deal, covering, for instance, sunset clauses and further
economic assistance for Iran, can be agreed upon. A follow-on deal seems more
difficult at this stage, particularly in light of next year's Iranian elections
and the contentiousness of the issues.
Q: What would guarantee the next administrations won’t
behave like Donald Trump’s and pull out of international deals unilaterally?
What are the lessons of the Trump era?
A: There is no guarantee of this. Iran must contend with the
risk that a Republican administration in 2024 will once more walk away from a
deal. The JCPOA was divisive and controversial in the United States, and there
will remain strong opposition to it in the Republican Party for years to come.
The lesson of the Trump era is that America is highly polarized and that
diplomatic agreements may be less enduring and stable than they were in the
past. However, if the Democrats win re-election in 2024, then this might allow
for the deal to become more institutionalized and accepted, particularly if
wider regional tensions can be reduced in the interim period.
Q: Do you expect Biden to sharply reverse the U.S. foreign
policy? May he turn his back on Saudi Arabia or reduce support for Israel?
A: I do not expect a sharp change in U.S. foreign policy. He
is likely to adopt a cooler policy to Saudi Arabia and may put pressure on the
Kingdom to end the war in Yemen. But Saudi Arabia will remain an important
counter-terrorism partner in the Middle East (West Asia), and an influential
player in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and the (Persian) Gulf. The
relationship may become less friendly, but it will not break. Biden's approach
to Israel will also be more cautious than that of the Trump administration.
There will be more emphasis on a two-state solution and more pressure over
Israeli settlements in the West Bank. But the U.S.-Israel relationship is
likely to remain generally strong and robust, even if the Iran issue is likely
to cause growing tensions between the two countries.
Q: It seems that the
United States’ blind support for Israel never helps create peace in West Asia
because Washington follows the policy of “Israel First”. What is your comment?
A: I disagree with the premise of the question. Of course,
the U.S. is highly sensitive to Israeli security and its concerns. That is
partly for historical reasons, given Israel's status and partly for domestic
political ones, given bipartisan support for Israel from both Jewish and
Christian religious communities in the United States. Despite its illegal
occupation of Palestinian territories, Americans consider Israel a democracy in
the Middle East (West Asia) surrounded by generally hostile Arab states, and
that fact is viewed as admirable and worthy of support in the United States.
But U.S. support is also for strategic reasons: Israel is a small but powerful
state, with the most capable armed forces in the region, highly advanced cyber
capabilities, and exceptionally strong intelligence services. That makes it a
useful ally.
Q: How do you measure
the November 27 assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh?
Why do Western countries don’t expect Iran to respond to the assassination?
A: The assassination of Mr. Fakhrizadeh was probably
conducted by Israel, and follows several other killings over the past decade.
The assassination was a highly provocative move and probably aimed at
disrupting the incoming Biden administration's effort to re-join the JCPOA.
From Israel's perspective, it is worth understanding that Mr. Fakhrizadeh
probably continued his involvement in some weapons-related activities, although
I do not endorse his killing. In the longer-term, I doubt that the killing will
significantly affect Iran's ability to develop its nuclear program and even nuclear
weapons if it chose to do so. On the
second point: Western countries do not want Iran to respond violently because
they fear that it may cause a spiral of escalation, culminating in military
action. I think that many Iranian officials share this concern, too. This is
not just Western logic. But I think most Western countries also realize that
Iran may have to demonstrate some sort of response, such as the parliamentary
bill that was passed two weeks ago. The aim is to ensure that tensions do not
rise in a way that might make it impossible for both sides to restore the JCPOA
after January 20th.
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