Gen. Soleimani assassination ‘a flagrant example of state terrorism’: Richard Falk

The cruel assassination of Major General Qassem Soleimani by the US back in January 2020 “was a flagrant instance of state terrorism,” remarked Richard Anderson Falk, a professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University.
Falk makes the comments in an exclusive interview as Iran is
marking the assassination anniversary of the top military commander.
General Soleimani, who is known as a legendary commander in
the war against terrorists, was assassinated in the vicinity of Baghdad’s
international airport when he was on a peace mission to Iraq.
The esteemed international law professor also believes,
“Iran has opposed non-state political violence of groups such as ISIS or
Taliban that engage in terrorist activity by committing atrocities against
civilians that amount to Crimes Against Humanity.”
“Although a military officer, General Soleimani, was not in
any combat role when assassinated, and was engaged in peacemaking diplomacy on
a mission to Iraq” “Iran has also consistently condemned state terrorism of the
sort practiced by Israel and the United States,” stated the American professor
who served as the UN Human Rights Rapporteur in the occupied Palestinian
territories.
The following is the entire text of the interview conducted
and published by the Tehran Times:
“Q: In 1972, a specialized Committee on Terrorism was set up
at the United Nations, and member states made great efforts to provide
appropriate definitions of international terrorism, but due to intense
political differences, the actual definition of international terrorism and
comprehensive conventions in practice was impossible. Security Council
Resolution 1373 was the most serious attempt to define terrorism after 9/11,
which evolved into UN Security Council Resolution 1535. Despite providing a
definition of terrorism, countries approach it differently. What is the reason?
A: There exists a basic split between those political actors
that seek to define ‘terrorism’ as anti-state violence by non-state actors and
those actors that seek to define terrorism as violence directed at innocent
civilians, regardless of the identity of the perpetrator. The latter approach
to the definition reaches targeted or indiscriminate violence directed at
civilians even if the state is the perpetrator. States that act beyond their
borders to fulfill counterrevolutionary goals seek to stigmatize their
adversaries as terrorists while exempting themselves from moral and legal
accountability.
There exists a second basic split due to state practice
following political rather than legal criteria when identifying terrorist
actors. When the Taliban and Al Qaeda were opposing Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan they were identified as Mujahideen, but when seen as turning
against the West, they were put on the top of the terrorist list. Osama Bin
Laden once hailed as a Western ally deserving lavish CIA support became the
most wanted terrorist after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon. Such subjectivity and fluidity makes it virtually impossible to
develop a coherent and legal approach to ‘terrorist’ activity.
“The truth is that General Soleimani had been playing a leading counterterrorist role throughout the region. He is thought to have been primarily responsible for the ending, or at least greatly weakening, the threat posed by ISIS.”In essence, geopolitical actors have always sought to have international law regard the use of force by states acting on their own as falling outside the framework of terrorism while regarding transnational political violence by adversary or enemy non-state actors as terrorism even if the targeted person or organization is a government official or member of the armed forces, or if the non-state actor is resisting occupation by foreign armed forces.
Before the 9/11 attacks Israel influentially adopted this
approach in its effort to portray Palestinian resistance as a criminal
enterprise. After 9/11 the United States added its political weight to this
statist approach to the conception of terrorism, which meant in effect that any
adversary target that could be characterized as associated with a non-state
actor that resorted to armed struggle was criminalized to the extent of being
treated as unprotected by international humanitarian law. In practice, this
subjectivity was vividly displayed in recent years by support given to
anti-Castro Cuban exiles that engaged in political violence against the
legitimate Cuban government, and yet were given aid, support, and encouragement
while based in the United States.
The UN was mobilized after the 9/11 attacks by the United
State to support this statist/geopolitical approach to political violence,
which possessed these elements, and given formal expression in a series of
Security Council Resolutions, including 1373, 1535:
--terrorists are
individuals who engage in political violence on behalf of non-state actors;
--states, their
officials and citizens may be guilty of supporting such activities through
money, weapons, and safe haven, and therefore indictable under national law as
aiding and abetting terrorism;
--political violence by states, no matter what its
character, is to be treated by reference to international law, including
international humanitarian law, and not viewed as terrorism;
--even if the
non-state actor is exercising its right of resistance under international law
against colonialism or apartheid, its political violence will be treated as
‘terrorism’ if such a designation furthers geopolitical ambitions.
“Iran is legally entitled to provide assistance to such a
government (Syrian government) faced with insurgent challenges from within its
boundaries.” The alternative view of terrorism that I endorse emphasizes the
nature of political violence, rather than the identity of the perpetrator. As
such, political violence can be identified as ‘state terrorism,’ which amounts
to uses of force that are outside the framework of war and peace, and violate
the sovereign rights of a foreign country or fundamental rights of citizens
within the territory of the state. Such acts of terrorism may be clandestine or
overt, and may be attributed to state actors when counterrevolutionary groups
are authorized, funded, and encouraged directly or indirectly by the state.
Non-state actors can also be guilty of terrorism if their tactics and practices
deliberately target civilians or recklessly disregard risks of death or harm to
civilians.
Q: How do you assess the role and position of Iran in the
fight against terrorism in the region?
A: As far as I know, Iran has opposed non-state political
violence of groups such as ISIS or Taliban that engage in terrorist activity by
committing atrocities against civilians that amount to Crimes Against Humanity.
Iran has also consistently condemned state terrorism of the sort practiced by Israel
and the United States, and possibly other governments, within the region. In
this regard, Iran has been active both in the struggle against non-state and
state terrorism.
Iran has been accused of lending funding and material
support to non-state actors that many governments in the West officially
classify as ‘terrorist’ organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Part of the
justification for U.S. sanctions arises from this allegation that Iran supports
terrorism in the Middle East. These allegations are highly ‘political’ in
character as both Hezbollah and Hamas engaged in violent resistance directed at
unlawful occupation policies that denied basic national rights to the Lebanese
and Palestinian people, including the fundamental right of self-determination,
although some of their tactics and acts may have crossed the line of legality.
“When the Taliban and Al Qaeda were opposing Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan they were identified as Mujahideen, but when seen
as turning against the West, they were put on the top of the terrorist
list.”There are also contentions that Iran’s support for the Syrian government
in dealing with its domestic adversaries involves complicity in behavior that
violates the laws of war and international humanitarian law. This contention is
a matter of regional geopolitics. As far as international law is concerned, the
Assad government in Damascus is the legitimate representative of the Syrian
people, and is treated as such at the UN. Iran is legally entitled to provide
assistance to such a government faced with insurgent challenges from within its
boundaries. If the allegations are true that Syria has bombed hospitals and
other civilian sites, then the Syrian government could be charged with state
terrorism.
Q: How do you assess the role and position of General Qassem
Soleimani in the fight against terrorists, especially ISIS?
A: Although a military officer, General Soleimani, was not
in any combat role when assassinated, and was engaged in peacemaking diplomacy
on a mission to Iraq. His assassination was a flagrant instance of state
terrorism. With considerable irony, the truth is that General Soleimani had
been playing a leading counterterrorist role throughout the region. He is
thought to have been primarily responsible for the ending, or at least greatly
weakening, the threat posed by ISIS to the security of many countries in the
Middle East.
Q: Given the conflict of interests of different countries,
can we see the same action by countries against terrorism? What mechanism can
equalize the performance of countries against terrorism?
A: As suggested at the outset, without an agreed widely
adopted and generally agreed-upon definition of terrorism it is almost
impossible to create effective international mechanisms to contain terrorism.
As matters now stand, the identification of ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorism’ is
predominantly a matter of geopolitical alignment rather than the implementation
of prohibitions directed at unacceptable forms of political violence within
boundaries and across borders.
To imagine the emergence of effective international or
regional, mechanisms to combat terrorism at least four developments would have
to occur:
“As matters now stand, the identification of ‘terrorists’
and ‘terrorism’ is predominantly a matter of geopolitical alignment rather than
the implementation of prohibitions directed at unacceptable forms of political
violence within boundaries and across borders.”
--the reliance on legal criteria to categorize political
violence as terrorism;
--the inclusion of ‘state terrorism’ in the official
definition of terrorism;
--the inclusion of political violence within the sovereign
territory as well as across boundaries;
--an internationally or regionally agreed definition
incorporating these three elements and formally accepted by all major sovereign
states and by the United Nations.
In the present international atmosphere, such an
international consensus is impossible to achieve. The United States and Israel,
and a series of other important states would never agree. There are two sets of
obstacles: some states would not give up their discretion to attack civilian
targets outside their borders and would not accept accountability procedure
that impose limits on their discretion over the means used to deal with
domestic transnational non-state adversaries.
Under these conditions of geopolitical subjectivity such
that from some perspectives non-state actors are ‘freedom-fighters’ and from
others, they are ‘terrorists,’ no common grounds for meaningful and trustworthy
intergovernmental arrangements exists.
It remains important for individuals and legal experts to
advocate a cooperative approach to the prevention and punishment of terrorists
and terrorism by reference to an inclusive definition of terrorism that
considers political violence by states and by governments within their national
territory as covered.
It is also in some sense to include non-state actors as
stakeholders in any lawmaking process that has any prospect of achieving both
widespread acceptance as a framework or implementation at behavioral levels. It
would seem, in this regard, important to prohibit torture of terrorist suspects
or denial of prisoner of war rights. One-sided legal regimes tend to be
rationalizations for unlawful conduct, and thus operate as political
instruments of conflict rather than legal means of regulation.”
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